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1. INTRODUCTION 
In Abbott et al. (2003), Jensen and
Meckling (1976) suggested that demand for
auditing stems from a desire to reduce
managements shirking, resulting from
information asymmetries, which arises from
the separation of ownership and control. Ojo
(2009) expressed that the involvement of
external auditors could contribute to
corporate governance and address the
expressed agency problem, because the
auditor can facilitate a situation where by
managers are encouraged or compelled to be
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respondents perceived size of audit fee as the most influencing factor, capable of deterring auditor
independence in Nigeria. It was also observed that existing laws were obsolete and need to be
updated to make them relevant. 
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(2002) pointed out that financial audit
remains an integral part of corporate
governance.
Despite the prominence ascribed to
external audit function, the sovereignty of
the external auditor is an issue currently
attracting scholarly scrunity. Mautz and
Sharaf (1961) in Arnold et al.(1999) noted
that, auditors must be constantly aware of
factors that affect the audit environment
which can influence or harm their
independence in other to ensure confidence
of investors. Supporting this statement, Xu
and Wang (2008) reiterated that
independence has long been recognized as
the most important defining characteristic of
the public accounting profession. 
However, the spate of corporate failure in
developed and developing economies all
over the world, have stirred the quest to
ascertain if the failures are associated with
the independence required of statutory
auditors. Byrne (2001), as well as Ayvaz and
Pehlivanli (2010) expressed that objectivity
or “independence of mind” is essential for
the exercise of professional judgement,
which has continued to be an important
topic.  In the same vein, Callaghan et al.
(2009) identified auditor independence as a
necessary condition for effective auditing. In
the light of these statements, this research
sought to empirically examine the
independence of statutory auditors in
Nigeria, with emphasis on same selected
audit firms.
1.1. Statement of the Problem 
Adelaja (2009) expressed that credible
financial information is vital to the growth of
any economy; also auditors are expected to
be independent and objective in the
discharge of their responsibilities. Gallegos
(2004) was of the view that the report of
external auditors in corporate financial
statements is seen as providing key
assurance to the interest of shareholders. 
O’Connor (2006) stated that one of the
most vexing problems in the financial world
today, is the emphasis placed on ensuring the
independence of external auditors as a result
of recent economic scandals. Beattie &
Fearnley (2002) expressed that after the
collapse of Enron, it was generally believed
that rendering of non-audit services
compromised the independence of external
auditors. An extract from the website of
Institute of Chartered Accountants England
and Wales (ICAEW) (2009), reiterated that
the independence of statutory auditors is a
rather complex issue. 
In the real world, when business entities
go out of business, the consequences are
usually enormous.  The oversight function of
the auditor is placed under scrutiny when a
business whose financial statement once
showed no indication of going out of
business suddenly becomes bankrupt.  As a
follow up to the oversight function, the
independence of the auditor also appears to
be in doubt.  On this premise this research
focuses on the possible challenges which
may be affecting the independence of
external auditors in Nigeria.
1.2. Aim and Objectives of the Research 
The primary objective of this research is
to elucidate on the independence of external
auditors in Nigeria. This was achieved by:
1) Appraising the factors that are
capable of influencing the independence of
auditors.
2) Evaluating the perception of the
Nigerian public, concerning the
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3) Identifying the factor that is most
capable of influencing the independence of
statutory auditors in Nigeria. 
1.3. Research Questions 
Supporting the research objectives set out
above, the following questions were
advanced and answered:
1) How does audit fee affect the
independence of auditors?
2) How does audit tenure affect the
independence of external auditors?
3) How does non-audit service
influence the independence of external
auditors?
4) Are there specific pronouncements
which define the independence of external
auditors in Nigeria?
5) Do audit firms in Nigeria make
returns of their financial activities?
6) What threats are peculiar to the
independence of external auditors in
Nigeria?
7) Does any relationship exist between
audit tenor, and audit fees?  
8) Do annual reports contain
information of non-audit services performed
by auditors?
1.4. Research Hypotheses 
The following research hypotheses flow
from the research questions that were raised;
Hypothesis One: Xu and Wang (2008),
and Callagham et al. (2009) argued that
independence of external auditors is mired
by performing non-audit services. Gul et al.
(2007) however suggested that non audit fees
may not prejudice the independence of
auditors where the audit engagement is not
for a short period of time.
These positions form the bases of the
hypothesis that:
Ho1: There is no correlation in the
perception of respondents, that fees from the
performance of non-audit services can deter
the independence of auditors in Nigeria. 
HI1: There is a correlation in the
perception of respondents, that fees from the
performance of non-audit services can deter
the independence of auditors in Nigeria.
Hypothesis Two:  Klimentchenko (2009)
was of the view that it is likely for an auditor
who has been auditing a client for several
years to let down on his guard. With regards
to tenure, Davis et al. (2000), suggested that
there existed a significant negative
relationship between tenure and absolute
analyst forecast errors.  With respect to
auditors in Nigeria, the hypothesis below
was tested.
Ho2: There is no significant correlation in
the opinion of respondents that prolonged
audit tenure can impair the independence of
statutory auditors.
HI2: There is a significant correlation in
the opinion of respondents that prolonged
audit tenure can impair the independence of
statutory auditors.
Hypothesis Three: In an effort to
understand the opinions expressed by
respondents, a ranking was done to test the
hypothesis that;
Ho3: There is no significant agreement in
the opinion of respondents on the ranking of
factors capable of influencing the
independence of statutory auditors in
Nigeria.
HI3: There is a significant agreement in
the opinion of respondents on the ranking of
factors capable of influencing the
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Where  Ho:is the null hypothesis and HI:
is the alternative hypothesis.
2. SIGNIFICANCE AND THE
CONCEPT OF THE STUDY 
This research dwells on the independence
of auditors particularly within the context of
listed companies in Nigeria.  The findings of
this research are expected to contribute to
existing body of knowledge. Practicing
auditors in Nigeria are anticipated to become
more informed of the intricacies surrounding
auditor independence. The academic
community will also benefit enormously
from the outcome of this research. 
2.1. Scope and Limitation of the Study
This research centers on the independence
of external auditors within the context of
listed companies in Nigeria. This research
excludes audits of non listed companies and
internal audit function of companies. The
outcome of this research is based on what is
obtained in Nigeria. It is likely that the
opinions expressed may not represent the
views of every Nigerian; however these
variations are not expected to adversely
influence the findings of this research. 
2.2. The Concept of Auditor
Independence 
The initial concept of auditor
independence was primarily of British
origin, in the 19th century, where auditors
doubled as book keepers (Baker, 2005).
Aderibigbe (2005) views independence as an
emotive word serving as a banner for
freedom, integrity and all that is good.
Auditor independence according to
Dictionary of International Accounting
Terms (2001) infers a state of impartiality
required of auditors who should have no
personal or financial involvement with a
client. Louwers et al. (2007) expresses
independence as a mental attitude and
physical appearance which portrays the
auditor as being uninfluenced by others in
judgment and decision. This can be sustained
by avoiding financial connection that makes
it appear that the wealth of the auditor
depends on the outcome of the audit and
management connections that makes the
auditor appear as if he is involved in
management decisions.  As a key ingredients
of audit quality Gray & Manson (2000) and
Hayes et al. (2005) described independence
as a position required in other to take an
unbiased viewpoint in the performance of
audit tests, analysis of results and attestation
in the audit report. Despite all the definitions,
and descriptions of auditor independence,
Whittington & Pany (2004) concluded that
auditor independence is relative and not
absolute. According to Tairu (2009), auditor
independence comprises of programming
independence, investigation independence,
and reporting independence. Of these three
components, reporting independence is the
most likely to be influenced by the directors
of a client company. This is the foci of this
research. The independence of auditors is
seen as a means and not an end in itself
(McGrath,et al., 2001).  Consequently, Smith
(2003) opined that the prime responsibility
of maintaining independence and objectivity
rests with the auditor. 
2.3. Threats to Auditor Independence 
From the foregoing, an auditor is
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which may affect his opinion about the state
of affairs of his client’s business.  The
auditor is required to be independent and
also be seen to be independent by
stakeholders of the entity he is reporting on.
Threat according to Chambers Dictionary
(2002), implies a source of danger.  It may be
perceived that threat to independence
connotes circumstances that can jettison the
“unbiasedness” of the auditor.  Threat to
auditor independence have been broadly
categorized as one or a combination of self-
interest, self-review, advocacy, familiarity
(or trust) and intimidation threat (ICAN
Membership Handbook 1999; et al., 2001;
Millichamp 2001; Adeniyi, 2002; Report,
2003; Hayes et al., 2005).The elements that
are likely to give rise to these threats include
tenure (Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002),
rendering of non audit services (Xu & Wang,
2008), ability of managers to influence the
compensation of auditors (Yost, 1995), size
of the audit firm (Salehi & Mansoury, 2009),
and strength of audit committee (Abbott et
al., 2003).  Other factors according to
Abubakar et al. (2005) include; highly
competitive audit service market, large size
of audit fees and non existence of audit
committees.  
2.4. Tenure of Audit 
Tenure of audit refers to the number of
years audit firms or engagement partners
have spent on the audit of a particular client.
There have been heated debates on the
relevance of tenure to the independence of
auditors. Klimentchenko (2009) was of the
opinion that if an auditor (or a representative
of the audit firm) reviews the financial
information of a client, year-after-year, he
becomes familiar with the business of his
client, develops a desire to maintain good
rapport with the manager of the client’s
business and thereby losing his impartiality.
Consequently, Davies et al. (2000) examined
some arguments for and against how tenure
influences the independence of auditors. The
arguments against presupposes that the
longer an audit firm retains a client, the less
able it is, to maintain objectivity. On the
contrary, the  arguments for, suggested that
the longer an auditor is on an engagement the
better will be, his understanding of the
client’s risk areas. This will result in a more
effective audit. Gul et al. (2007) reiterated
that when audit tenure is short, non audit fees
may impair the independence of the auditor. 
It is apparent that prolonged stay on an
audit may result in familiarity threat. To curb
this threat mandatory rotation of audit
engagements have been advocated (Byrne,
2001). In the view of Kilcommins (1997),
long audit tenure was perceived to impair
auditor independence because it encourages
auditors to become cosy in their relationships
with their clients. Fairchild (2009) reiterated
that the longer an auditor is, with a client,
learning curve effect sets in.  This will enable
the auditor to detect managerial frauds more
quickly; on the other hand the auditor may
become sympathetic towards management
thereby losing his independence. 
2.5. Non-Audit Services 
An observation of statutory
pronouncements like Section 357 of the
Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990
(CAMA, 1990), requires registered
companies to have their financial statements
audited by an independent auditor for any
financial year. It can be perceived that
managers are responsible for the preparation
of annual accounts, designing and
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all ensure the smooth running of the
business. Non-audit services, which
constitute the source of non-audit income,
may be described as any other service
rendered to an audit client different from the
examination of accounts and expressing a
professional opinion thereof. These services
are also referred to as consultancy services
(Louwers et al., 2007). Ye et al. (2006),
opined that the economic dependence of
auditors on non-audit services, lengthy audit
tenure and personal relationships built
through alumni employees have contributed
to the erosion of auditor independence. As
such Hay et al. (2006) suggests that there
exists a potential for the impairment of
auditor independence in appearance when
they render non-audit services. To mitigate
self-interest threat which is caused by
rendering non-audit services (Byrne, 2001),
recommended the implementation of
pronouncements like Section 202 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley act of 2002, which expressly
prohibits the rendering of non- audit services
by statutory auditors. Abbott et al. (2003)
proffered that companies with independent
audit committees pay lower non-audit
services fees. However Reiner & Bent (2009)
proposed that the rendering of non-audit
advisory services increases quasi-rents, thereby
posing a threat to auditor independence.
2.6. Influence of Managers on Audit
Fee
In an attempt to evaluate the influence
managers exert on auditors, Yost (1995)
demonstrated that increased ability of
managers to determine the compensation of
auditors may in fact increase incentives for
an auditor to maintain independence.  Mitra
et al. (2007) observed that there exists a
significant positive relationship between
diffused institutional share holdings and
audit fee, and a significantly negative
relationship between institutional block
holder ownership and audit fee. The
implication of this is that where the shares of
a company are held by many investors, audit
fees may very likely be determined by
management, unlike where shares are held
by a few, in which case it would be
convenient for the few owners to meet, in
other to determine the audit fee. Though it
has been severally argued that non-audit fees
can influence the independence of auditors,
it is also likely that the influencing power of
managers on the audit fee payable to the
auditor may be an issue which should not be
ignored.  Gul (1999) recorded that the size of
audit fee is a major explanatory factor for the
ability of the auditor to resist the pressure of
management, regardless of the provision of
advisory services.  Green (2006), reiterated
that as businesses become more complex and
the relationship between company
management and company ownership
becomes more problematic, the issue of
auditor independence becomes more
difficult.  He added that as long as the auditor
is subject to influence from company
management, real independence remains
difficult to achieve. 
2.7. Size of Audit Firm 
Salehi & Mansoury (2009) using audit
from size as a surrogate, for audit quality
expressed that the size of an audit firm is an
important characteristic that reflects auditor
independence.  Lys & Watts (1994) were of
the view that larger audit firms have better
financial resources and research facilities,
superior technology and more talented
employees to undertake large company
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audit firms are able to resist pressure from
management than smaller audit firms. 
Muhammad & Karbhari (2006) in
agreement with Lys & Watts (1994), opined
that big audit firms are better able to resist
management pressure in conflict situations
than smaller audit firms.   Contrary to these
views, Emby & Davidson (1998) opined that
the size of the participant audit firm, relative
to the size of the client did not exert any
influence on the judgment of the auditor.
Gray & Manson (2001) in examining the
effect of firm size on auditor independence,
observed that while small and medium audit
firms may suffer from inadequate resources,
to service their large clients, the big audit
firms appear as business ventures rather than
professional service providers. 
2.8. Other Factors Influencing the
Independence of Auditors 
In addition to the factors earlier identified,
Bonu & Kitindi (2004) identified the size of
audit market and level of competition in the
market of audit services as factors capable of
influencing the independence of auditors.
They noted that the presence of a large
number of audit firms competing in a small
market for audit services increased perceived
auditor independences as opposed to a few
firms operating in a monopoly market.  In the
same vein, Abu Bakar & Ahmad (2009)
suggested that the existence of an audit
committee will enhance the independence of
auditors.
2.9. Nature of Auditor Independence in
Nigeria 
From the foregoing the independence of
external auditors appears to have generated
considerable concern.  In Nigeria the cry for
the independence of external auditors
appears not to be too different.  In the world
of statutory audit, audit firms can be referred
as either “big players” or “small players”.
The classification is often based on
geographical spread, staff strength and
quality, and volume of audit work done.
There have been instances where auditors
have not qualified their reports in respect of
the business of a client. Such that,
subsequent to an audit a business suddenly
becomes insolvent, and acts of financial
mismanagement might have gone unnoticed
in previous years audit by the same audit
firm. This scenario is not too strange in the
business community of Nigeria. This has
brought to bear the relevance of auditor
independence in lending credibility to
audited annual financial reports. The factors
affecting the independence of auditors
appear to be universal and are undoubtedly
capable of affecting external auditors in
Nigeria. 
A substantial proportion of practicing
auditors in Nigeria are members of the
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria
(ICAN), Association of National
Accountants of Nigeria (ANAN), and
Institute of Public Accountants (IPA).  These
professional bodies have rules guiding the
conduct of members in practice.  There are
also specific provisions in the Companies
and Allied Matters Act of 1990 that aims at
safeguarding and enforcing the
independence of external auditors. Section
359(6) specifically recommends companies
to have an audit committee.  The committee
is poised to uphold the independence of
auditors with respect to determining their
audit fee, as well as their appointment and
removal. Similar to what is obtained in
developed economies, cases of corporate
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fraudulent practices of managers have
caused one to wonder if the independence of
statutory auditors in Nigeria is not in doubt.
Aderibigbe (2005), in his research observed
that in many companies across Nigeria,
directors are empowered to determine audit
fees of statutory auditors.  This situation, no
doubt may incapacitate the audit committee,
and cause the auditor to undermine his
independence.  A World Bank report of 2004,
brought to bear the inadequate adherence to
auditing standards and professional ethics
among statutory auditors.  In addition it was
pointed out that existing ethical codes were
not in line with international requirements.
Within the banking sector it was also noted
that monitoring and enforcing mechanism
are very weak. From the foregoing review of
literature, this research suggests that there
exists a relationship between prolonged audit
tenure, audit fee, and size of audit firm on the
one hand and perceived independence of
auditors on the other hand. Between these
two extremes exists the inter play of strength
of audit committee, intensity of competition
in the market for audit services and finally
the enforcement powers of both regulatory
and professional bodies. 
3. METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH 
This research is based on a survey of
selected companies operating in Nigeria that
are listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange.
Emphasis was placed on business activities
between the periods from 2000 to 2008
financial years.  The research was designed
to capture how selected respondents perceive
the independence of auditors in Nigeria. A
pilot study was conducted using five samples
of a questionnaire. This was to ensure the
relevancy of the data gathering instrument.
The reliability of the data gathering
instrument was ascertained using a test- re-
test correlation.
The study population used in this research
comprised of auditors, shareholders,
lecturers of accounting, stockbrokers, and
individuals in the capacity of managers in
companies listed on the Stock Exchange. The
auditors were identified from the Institute of
Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN)
website; Stockbrokers were identified on the
floor of the Nigerian Stock Exchange, while
individuals in the capacity of managers were
reached, at their different head offices. The
accounting lectures were from the University
of Lagos, University of Maiduguri, Ajayi
Crowther University (Oyo) and Yaba Tech.
(Lagos). 
Purpose sampling technique was adopted
in the selection of respondents required for
this research.  This technique was considered
suitable because of the emphasis on the
knowledge of auditor independence.
However, the organizations and individuals
used for the research were randomly selected
from the strata of five identified from the
study population.  Twenty respondents were
selected for each of the strata to avoid
opinions gathered from being skewed. A
total of one hundred respondents made up
the sample size.
Primary data were extensively relied upon
in the performance of this research.
Questionnaires and structured interview
were used to gather the primary data.  Some
of the instruments were administered
personally while some were forwarded as
attachments through emails and returned via
the same method.  Where physical interviews
could not be conducted, telephone
conversations were used.  The questionnaire
was designed to capture both demographic
254 S. B. Adeyemi / SJM 6 (2) (2011) 247 - 267and topical data.  The topical data were
captured on a four likert scale type measure
in two sections.  The first section measured
very weak, weak, strong and very strong
opinions. The weights attached to these
opinions were 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively. The
second section, measured strongly agrees,
agree, disagree and strongly disagree
opinions. The weights assigned to these
opinions were 4, 3, 2, and 1, respectively.  
In addition to the primary data, secondary
data were used. The secondary data were
gathered from annual reports. Some of the
annual reports were obtained from the
Securities and Exchange Commission on
Victoria Island, some were obtained from the
Nigerian Accounting Standards Board at
Ikeja, while some were obtained from the
different head offices in Lagos State. Annual
reports used were for the periods from year
2000 to year 2008.  The secondary data
gathered from the annual reports include the
tenure of auditors, and value of audit fees.
Both primary and secondary data were
analyzed using, descriptive and inferential
statistics. Inferential statistics were
performed at a 0.05 level of significance
using SPSS version 15.0. Kendall’s Measure
of Concordance was performed to measure
the degree of correlation among the rankings
of the respondents. This tool was used
because the sample size was more than 20
and the ordinal variables were more than
two. (Ifah, 1996).  Hypotheses one and two
were tested using Pearson product moments
correlation coefficient (Đorđević et al.,
2010). The Pearson correlation is measured
from -1 to +1. -1 implies an absolute
negative correlation, 0 signifies no
correlation and +1 indicates an absolute
positive correlation. (Winks online, 2009). 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
Table 1 presents a frequency distribution
of the sample size used in this research. The
sample was drawn from the study
population. A total sample of one hundred
respondents was drawn from the population. 
4.1. Test of Hypotheses 
The hypotheses purported for this
research are tested below using a
combination of the data gathered from
responses to the questionnaire, interview and
secondary data. Table 2, contains outputs of
Pearson correlation coefficients, depicting
the correlation between the factors
influencing the independence of statutory
auditors in Nigeria. From Table 2 it was
observed that there exists a positive and
relatively strong correlation between the
responses on disclosure of income from non-
audit services and prolonged audit tenure of
0.092. A correlation of 0.060 exists between
the disclosure of non–audit income in
financial statements of audit firms and the
ability fee from non-audit services to deter
the independence of auditors. This
relationship is also positive and relatively
strong. Between the opinions that audit firms
should be allowed to perform non-audit
services for their audit client and the need for
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Table 1. Frequency distribution of
respondents 
Strata 
Category 
Sample 
Size 
% of total 
sample 
Lecturer 20  20 
Manager 20  20 
Practicing 
auditor 
20 20 
Stockbroker 20  20 
Shareholder 20  20 
TOTAL 100  100 
Source: Research Survey 2010the financial statements of audit firms to
clearly disclose how much is earned from
non-audit service there exist a correlation is
0.067. However, a relatively weak but
positive correlation of 0.014 was observed to
be present between performance of non-audit
services and prolonged audit tenure.  With
respect to the correlation of opinions
between allowing auditors to perform non-
audit services and the effect of audit fee on
independence, there exists a negative
correlation of -0.049. These correlation
figures were further used to test hypotheses
one and two.
4.1.1. Test of Hypothesis One 
Ho1: There is no correlation in the
perception of respondents, that fees from the
performance of non-audit services can deter
the independence of auditors in Nigeria.
Using the figures from the table 2, there
exist a relative but negative correlation of -
0.049 between the perception that auditors
should be allowed to concurrently perform
non-audit services for their clients and the
ability of non-audit fees to deter auditor
independence. It can be inferred that the
independence of auditors becomes more
deterred, where non-audit services are
performed concurrently and where there is
no disclosure. With respect to significance,  r
(98) = -0.049, p>0.05, the inference that can
be drawn is that there is no significant
difference in the opinions expressed by the
sampled respondents. The observed
correlation of opinions between prolonged
audit tenure and concurrent rendering of
non-audit services is 0.014. This implies that
there exists a relative positive correlation in
the opinions expressed. The frequency
distribution in the Appendix I(M) relating to
these views showed that a cumulative of
eighty three representing eighty three
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Table 2. Output of Pearson correlation coefficient
  
Audit firms should 
be allowed to 
perform non-audit 
services for their 
audit client  
Financial statements of 
audit firms should 
clearly disclose how 
much is earned from 
non-audit service 
Fees from non audit 
services can deter 
auditor 
independence 
Prolonged audit 
tenure can impair the 
independence of 
auditors 
Audit firms should be 
allowed to perform non-
audit services for their 
audit client   
  
Pearson 
Correlation  1  
Sig. (2-
tailed)   
N  100  
Financial statements of 
audit firms should clearly 
disclose how much is 
earned from non-audit 
service  
Pearson 
Correlation  .067 1  
Sig. (2-
tailed)  .510  
N  100 100  
Fees from non audit 
services can deter auditor 
independence 
  
  
Pearson 
Correlation  -.049 .060 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed)  .630 .552  
N  100 100 100 
Prolonged audit tenure can 
impair the independence 
of auditors 
  
  
Pearson 
Correlation  .014 .092 -.223(*)  1
Sig. (2-
tailed)  .886 .365 .026 
N  100 100 100  100
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Source: Field survey 2010percent, of the respondents disagreed that
auditors should be allowed to concurrently
render non-audit services. In the same vein,
Appendix I(L) depicted that all the
respondents  represented by a cumulative of
one hundred percent of the views expressed,
agreed that prolonged audit tenure could
hinder the independence of auditors.  At a p
value of 0.886, it can be inferred that there is
no significant difference in the views
expressed concerning prolonged audit tenure
and rendering of non-audit services. As such,
it can be assumed that prolonged auditor
tenure and performance of non-audit services
may deter the independence of auditors.
4.1.2. Test of Hypothesis Two
Ho2: There is no correlation in the
opinion of respondents that prolonged audit
tenure can impair the independence of
statutory auditors.
From the Table 2, the intercept between
opinions relating to prolonged audit tenure
and deterring effect of non audit fee show a
negative but relative Pearson correlation of -
0.223. At this point, the r (98) = -0.223, p< α.
This implies that though the association
between the two perceptions is weak, it is
significant. It can be suggested therefore,
that prolonged audit tenure can impair the
independence of statutory auditors. In the
same vain non- audit fees can also deter the
independence of auditors in Nigeria.
4.1.3. Test of Hypothesis Three
Ho3: There is no significant agreement in
the opinion of respondents on the ranking of
factors capable of influencing the
independence of statutory auditors in
Nigeria.
From Table 3 which contains the ranking
of factors capable of influencing
independence of statutory auditors on
Nigeria, it was observed that the most
deterring factor is large audit fee. This is
followed in a descending order of severity by
prolonged audit tenure, size of the audit firm,
intensity of competition in the market of
audit services, strength of audit committee,
enforcement power of professional bodies,
and lastly the enforcing power of statutory
bodies.
A test of correlation of opinions expressed
was performed using Kendall’s Measure of
Concordance. The output of this test is
presented in Table 4. It was deduced that the
factor perceived to impair auditor
independence most, was the size of audit fee.
It was also observed from annual reports of
selected companies that over the years the
amount paid as audit fee increased. Based on
the extract above it may be inferred that there
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Table 3. Distribution of frequencies and means of ranks
Ranked variables  N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean 
Prolonged audit tenure  100  2.00  7.00  5.4900 
Large  audit fee  100  1.00  7.00  5.7000 
Size of audit firm  100  1.00  7.00  4.3300 
Intensity of competition  100  2.00  6.00  3.8200 
Strength of audit committee  100  1.00  7.00  3.5900 
Strength of professional bodies  100  1.00  7.00  2.9200 
Strength of regulatory bodies  100  1.00  7.00  2.3300 
Valid N (listwise)  100        
Source: Research Survey 2010exists some degree of association in the
rankings of factors capable of affecting
independence of statutory auditors in
Nigeria. 
4.2. Other Findings and Observations 
With respect to the independence of
external auditors in Nigeria, the following
observations were made in the research;
1) Directors of companies play a key
role in the determination of audit fees.
Though the Companies and Allied Matters
Act of 1990 entrusted the audit committee
with the determination of audit fee, the
argument is that whether or not, whatever
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Table 4.Correlation output of Kendall’s measure of  concordance
  
  
Ranking 
for  
tenure 
Ranking 
for  
audit fee 
Ranking 
for size  
of  
audit firm
Ranking for 
intensity of 
competition 
Ranking for 
strength of 
audit 
committee 
Ranking for 
strength of 
professional 
bodies 
Ranking for 
regulatory 
bodies 
Kendall's 
tau_b 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Ranking for 
tenure 
  
Correlation 
Coefficient  1.000             
Sig. (2-tailed)  .             
N  100             
Ranking for 
audit fee  
Correlation 
Coefficient  -.109  1.000           
Sig. (2-tailed)  .193  .           
N  100  100           
Ranking for 
size of audit 
firm  
Correlation 
Coefficient  -.445(**)  .214(**)  1.000         
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000  .009  .         
N  100  100  100         
Ranking for 
intensity of 
competition  
Correlation 
Coefficient  -.385(**)  .460(**)  .170(*)  1.000       
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000  .000  .033  .       
N  100  100  100  100       
Ranking for 
strength of 
audit 
committee  
Correlation 
Coefficient  .094  -.160  -.190(*)  -.495(**)  1.000     
Sig. (2-tailed)  .251  .055  .017  .000  .     
N  100  100  100  100  100     
Ranking for 
strength of 
professional 
bodies 
Correlation 
Coefficient  -.121  -.188(*)  -.234(**) .093  -.249(**)  1.000   
Sig. (2-tailed)  .144  .026  .004  .257  .002  .   
N  100  100  100  100  100  100   
Ranking for 
regulatory 
bodies  
Correlation 
Coefficient  .283(**)  -.525(**) -.301(**) -.442(**)  .312(**)  -.168(*)  1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .001  .000  .000  .000  .000  .047  . 
N  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Source: Research Survey 2010
Table 5. Extract of  positive p values from Table 4
Point of Intercept                   k value                p value      Comment 
Size of audit fee and 
strength of professional bodies               -.188    .026         significant correlation 
Size of audit firm and intensity of      
competition                                                    .170    .033         significant correlation       
Size of audit firm and strength of    
audit committee                                            -.190    .017         significant correlation       
Strength of professional bodies 
and strength of regulatory bodies               -.168    .047         significant correlation might have been decided by management is
being ratified by the audit committee. It was
gathered in the course of the research that
most times the directors fix audit fees which
are not always ratified by the audit
committee. This act has brought to bear an
area of weakness in the audit committee
function in Nigeria.
2) Existing ethical codes appear to be
obsolete. A substantial proportion of
opinions expressed that existing ethical
codes were no longer capable of enforcing
the independence of auditor.
3) With respect to tenure, the ICAN
ethical code (1998) prescribed seven years as
the maximum tenure for which an auditor
can audit a client consecutively. Reacting to
this provision based on the questionnaire and
interview, an average of four years was
recommended by the sampled respondents.
An observation of Appendix II revealed that
some companies have maintained the same
auditor for more than six years. 
4) From Appendix II, a cross-sectional
view of some companies listed in Nigeria,
showed that many companies maintained the
service of the same audit firm consecutively
for many years. It was also observed the
amount paid for audit fee increased from
year to year.
5) It may be argued that where there is
no transparency, independence may be
impaired. As such it was suggested that
auditors should be made to publish their
financial statements.  Table J in appendix I,
showed that a total of fifty-six percent of the
respondents agreed. It was further stated that
at the moment audit firms in Nigeria are not
body corporate and are not mandated by any
law to publish their financial statements.
6) The annual reports examined did not
make any specific declaration of amounts
paid for non-audit services. Hence based on
the disclosures in the annual reports it may
be insinuate that auditors of such companies
did not render professional services while
acting as auditors. Where accounting
services of accounting firms were used, it
was observed that many of the companies
used accounting firms different from the
reporting auditor. 
5. CONCLUSION
The divorce of ownership from
management function in the world of
business has created an aperture for
custodians to exercise their best of judgment.
In the present day business world, parties
with stake include managers and directors
(agents), stakeholders like government,
employees, and providers of loan, trade
creditors and potential investors. It is
apparent, that as agents take decisions that
are capable of influencing the business,
owners, can also directly or indirectly
influence the operations of the business. To
checkmate decisions taken and ensure
correct reporting of state of affairs of a
business the audit function became a
necessity especially for publicly quoted
companies.
It has been expressed that credible
financial information is vital to the growth of
any economy, in the same vein that auditors
are expected to be independent and objective
in the discharge of their responsibilities.
Over the years, there have been series of
corporate scandals both in developed and
developing economies alike. This has raised
questions about the independence of the
auditor in the discharge of his statutory
function. To this end this research set to
elucidate on the independence of external
auditors in Nigeria, with emphasis on the
259 S. B. Adeyemi / SJM 6 (2) (2011) 247 - 267opinion of respondents. 
The outcome of the tests revealed that
among other factors capable of deterring the
independence of auditors in Nigeria, large
audit fees appeared to be the most
significant. It was also observed that in the
opinions expressed, prolonged auditor tenure
and performance of non-audit services may
deter the independence of auditors. It was
also noted that there are plenty of avenues
for secrecy both on the part of the company
being audited and the also on the part of the
auditing firm.
As such, the independence of auditors is
also of concern and importance in Nigeria.
Large audit fees, size of audit firm,
prolonged tenure have been asserted to be
some of the factors capable of influencing
the independence of auditors in Nigeria. It
was also observed that existing laws are old
and need to be reviewed to become relevant
in the prevailing business world.  Based on
the observations of this research, there
should be a law requiring auditors to publish
their financial statements.  In addition,
existing ethical codes and laws need to be
reviewed to address the contemporary
challenges of engendering greater level of
confidence in financial reporting and
auditing.
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УЧЕШЋЕ СТЕЈКХОЛДЕРА И ЊИХОВ УТИЦАЈ НА
СТАТУТОРНЕ АУДИТОРЕ У НИГЕРИЈИ
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Извод
Пред крај 19тог века, јавили су се чувени случајеви корпоративних превара и финансијских
проневера у тадашњим корпоративним гигантима. Серија превара је оставила утисак сумње у
непристрасност екстерних аудитора на разматрање њихове функције и кредибилитету
објављених финансијских извештаја. У овом светлу, ово истраживање се бави емпиријским
испитивањем перцепције независности аудитора у Нигерији. Попречна анализа је спроведена
која је укључивала предаваче из области аудита, аудиторе, берзанске мешетаре, деоничаре и
менаџере. Примарно сакупљени подаци су се веома заснивали на њиховим ставовима. Као
додатак, сакупљени су и секундарни подаци из годишњих извештаја. Сакупљени подаци су
употребњени да би се одговорило на истраживачка питања и да би се тестирале хипотезе.
тестирање хипотеза се заснивало на пеарсоновој корелацији и канделовој мери сагласности са
нивоом значајности од 0.05. Излаз наведених тесова је показао да је најутицајнији фактор, за
селектоване испитанике, висина плате и да овај фактор битно утиче на њихову независност у
Нигерији.  Такође је установљено да су постојећи закони застарели и потребно их је
осавременити како би били примењиви. 
Kључне речи: Аудитор, независност, стејкхолдерReferences
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APPENDIX I 
A:  Status of respondent 
   Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid  Lecturer  20  20.0  20.0  20.0 
Manager  20  20.0  20.0  40.0 
Practicing auditor  20  20.0  20.0  60.0 
Stockbroker  20  20.0  20.0  80.0 
Shareholder  20  20.0  20.0  100.0 
Total  100  100.0  100.0    
 
B:  Strength of audit committees in Nigeria to enforce independence of auditors 
   Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid  Very weak  32  32.0  32.0  32.0 
Weak  24  24.0  24.0  56.0 
Strong  28  28.0  28.0  84.0 
Very strong  16  16.0  16.0  100.0 
Total  100  100.0  100.0    
 
C: Ability of directors to influence audit fee 
   Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid  Very weak  6  6.0  6.0  6.0 
Weak  16  16.0  16.0  22.0 
Strong  53  53.0  53.0  75.0 
Very strong  25  25.0  25.0  100.0 
Total  100  100.0  100.0    
 
D: Power of the auditor to express a qualified opinion 
   Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid  Very weak  13  13.0  13.0  13.0 
Weak  23  23.0  23.0  36.0 
Strong  40  40.0  40.0  76.0 
Very strong  24  24.0  24.0  100.0 
Total  100  100.0  100.0    
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E: Effect of audit firm size on the independence of the auditor 
   Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid  Very weak  6  6.0  6.0  6.0 
Weak  18  18.0  18.0  24.0 
Strong  54  54.0  54.0  78.0 
Very strong  22  22.0  22.0  100.0 
Total  100  100.0  100.0    
 
F: Ability of professional bodies to enforce independence of  practicing members 
   Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid  Very weak  13  13.0  13.0  13.0 
Weak  28  28.0  28.0  41.0 
Strong  49  49.0  49.0  90.0 
Very strong  10  10.0  10.0  100.0 
Total  100  100.0  100.0    
 
G: Independence of "big" audit firms in Nigeria 
   Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid  Very weak  13  13.0  13.0  13.0 
Weak  16  16.0  16.0  29.0 
Strong  59  59.0  59.0  88.0 
Very strong  12  12.0  12.0  100.0 
Total  100  100.0  100.0    
 
H: Independence of "small" audit firms in Nigeria 
   Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid  Very weak  25  25.0  25.0  25.0 
Weak  47  47.0  47.0  72.0 
Strong  21  21.0  21.0  93.0 
Very strong  7  7.0  7.0  100.0 
Total  100  100.0  100.0    
 
I: Intensity of competition in the market of audit services in Nigeria 
   Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid  Very weak  12  12.0  12.0  12.0 
Weak  26  26.0  26.0  38.0 
Strong  58  58.0  58.0  96.0 
Very strong  4  4.0  4.0  100.0 
Total  100  100.0  100.0    266 S. B. Adeyemi / SJM 6 (2) (2011) 247 - 267
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 J: The published financial statements of audit firms should clearly disclose how   
much is earned from non-audit service 
   Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid  Very weak  14  14.0  14.0  14.0 
   Weak  25  25.0  25.0  39.0 
   Strong  44  44.0  44.0  83.0 
   Very strong  17  17.0  17.0  100.0 
   Total  100  100.0  100.0    
 
K: Fee from non audit services can deter auditor independence 
   Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid  Agree  37  37.0  37.0  37.0 
Strongly agree  63  63.0  63.0  100.0 
Total  100  100.0  100.0    
 
L: Prolonged audit tenure can impair the independence of auditors 
   Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid  Agree  55  55.0  55.0  55.0 
Strongly agree  45  45.0  45.0  100.0 
Total  100  100.0  100.0    
 
M: Audit firms should be allowed to perform non-audit services for   
their audit client concurrently 
   Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid  Very weak  32  32.0  32.0  32.0 
Weak  51  51.0  51.0  83.0 
Strong  10  10.0  10.0  93.0 
Very strong  7  7.0  7.0  100.0 
Total  100  100.0  100.0    
 
Source: Field Survey, 2010 
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